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Abstract
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of federalism is at best undergoing an un-
finished transformation, and is at worst just troubled and unsatisfying. In a little-
noticed dissent in Tennessee v. Lane, Justice Scalia proposed an approach that
could be generalized well beyond the specific position that he took in that case.
Thus generalized, this approach may be understood as an elaboration of a pro-
posal made by Justice O’Connor in her dissenting opinion twenty years ago in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. If adopted by the Court, this synthe-
sis of the O’Connor and Scalia suggestions could work a real transformation in its
federalism jurisprudence, and without some of the potentially radical side-effects
that have thus far made the Court timorous and inconsistent. This very short paper
explains how the synthesis would work, and why the Court should adopt it.
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Fig Leaf Federalism and Tenth Amendment Exceptionalism
Nelson Lund†
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of federalism is at best undergoing an unfinished
transformation, and is at worst just troubled and unsatisfying. In a little-noticed dissent in Tennessee
v. Lane,1 Justice Scalia proposed an approach that could be generalized well beyond the specific
position that he took in that case. Thus generalized, this approach may be understood as an
elaboration of a proposal made by Justice O’Connor in a dissenting opinion twenty years ago. If
adopted by the Court, this synthesis of the O’Connor and Scalia suggestions could work a real
transformation in  the Court’s federalism jurisprudence, and without some of the potentially radical
side-effects that have thus far made the Court timorous and inconsistent. Perhaps not insignificantly,
I think I can describe where it might take us without producing a hundred page article with a
thousand-odd footnotes.
I.   The Supreme Court’s Federalism Revival, and its Limits
Stripped to essentials, recent debates among the Justices about states’ rights begin with two
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contending propositions. The Court’s more “federalist” members insist that any doctrine that gives
Congress plenary authority to regulate the states must be wrong. They often point to the Tenth
Amendment, which emphatically confirms that the states have reserved powers untouched by the
establishment of a limited federal government.  Without quite disputing this claim about reserved
powers, the Court’s more “nationalist” members maintain that the Constitution identifies very few
protected spheres of state autonomy, and that judges should be extremely hesitant to constrain
congressional power except where the Constitution provides affirmative guidance.
In the 1985 Garcia decision,2 the nationalist position prevailed by a vote of 5-4. Justice
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court held that the states must look to the political process, rather than
to the courts, for protection from excessive federal regulation. Apparently recognizing that the
political process might fail in some unexpected way, however, the majority left open the possibility
(albeit a seemingly remote possibility) that the Court might someday have to identify “affirmative
limits” imposed on Congress by the “constitutional structure.”3 The dissenters considered the
majority’s passivity an improper abdication of the Court’s constitutional duty, and vowed to keep
fighting for meaningful restraints on federal power.
But where were federalist Justices to find “affirmative limits”? The first great problem they
faced is the Court’s extremely expansive interpretation of congressional power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. Much federal regulation of the states, as of private parties, is imposed pursuant
to Commerce Clause authority, which had become a kind of safe harbor for Congress when no other
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authority can be found. As Justice O’Connor recognized in her Garcia dissent, the framers of the
Constitution believed that the autonomy of the states would be protected by the fact that federal
powers are “few and defined,” and that the Commerce Clause in particular would give Congress
only a very narrow and limited authority.4 When the Commerce Clause was recast by the Court so
as to have few and undefined limits, one by-product was to create a threat to the basic structure of
federalism. And one for which the Constitution did not expressly provide a remedy.
Nor did the Garcia dissenters propose a clearly workable substitute for such a remedy.
Justice Powell proposed to balance the competing interests of the state and federal governments. But
his opinion contained no discussion of the federal government’s interest in the statute at issue in
Garcia itself, and thus no analytical balancing of the competing interests. Justice O’Connor
proposed a somewhat different approach, in which the Court would consider the value of state
autonomy an important factor in deciding whether a Commerce Clause regulation was consistent
with the spirit of the Constitution under the McCulloch test.5 Although more promising than
Powell’s, her approach still lacked the kind of definiteness that is needed in order to provide
meaningful guidance over a range of cases. As we shall see, an adjustment suggested by Scalia’s
Lane dissent could provide just what is needed.
This debate about federalism is closely related to recent debates about the Interstate
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
© Nelson Lund, 2005. Forthcoming in Constitutional Commentary
6  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-93 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
7  See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Virginia Law Review 1388 (1987);
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett,
New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 847 (2003).
4
Commerce Clause itself. The Tenth Amendment, of course, refers to the reserved rights both of the
states and of the people. And state autonomy would hardly be worth protecting except for the
contribution it can make to preserving the liberties of the citizenry. With respect to the Commerce
Clause, the federalist Justices again insist that any interpretation that gives Congress authority to
regulate anything and everything that citizens may do is inconsistent with the Constitution’s careful
and limited enumeration of powers, and must therefore be wrong. And once again, the nationalists
have resisted demands for the kind of line-drawing that the federalists have sought to undertake.
This debate has direct implications for the issue in Garcia both because regulations of the states are
often justified by invocations of the Commerce Clause, and because the state governments’ own
power to regulate their citizens—or to decide that they should not be regulated—is often preempted
by federal action under the Commerce Clause.
Perhaps the most obvious, or naïve, solution to the whole problem would be to restore the
original understanding of the Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas has argued,6 and others have
confirmed with overwhelming evidence,7 that the Clause was not meant to authorize the broad range
of federal regulations that are now routinely upheld. The term “commerce” in the Constitution refers
to buying, selling, and bartering, and transportation for the purpose of trade. The Interstate
Commerce Clause only authorizes regulation of commerce “among the several states,” and the Court
has mistakenly extended the Clause to activities that are not commerce among the several states on
the spurious rationale that they may “affect” such commerce.
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With the possible exception of Thomas himself, nobody on the Supreme Court seems to have
the slightest inclination to resurrect the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. Why not? Stare
decisis! Or, perhaps more precisely, a deep fear that reinstating the Constitution’s restrictions on
congressional power would interfere with too many well-established and politically popular federal
programs, and thereby create a political backlash that would embarrass the Justices.8 Rather than
entertain any idea so scary as that, the Court has carved out a series of small exceptions to the
virtually plenary police power that Congress had been allowed to acquire. These well-known
developments require only a brief summary.
C In United States v. Lopez,9 the Court suddenly put a limit on the well-established principle
that Congress could regulate wholly intrastate activities with no discernable effects on
interstate commerce if the aggregate effect of the class of targeted activities would
substantially affect interstate commerce. Henceforth, this “aggregation” technique may be
applied only to commercial or economic activities, a conclusion confirmed in United States
v. Morrison.10
C In a series of decisions beginning with Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,11 the Court has
concluded that respect for the dignity of the states requires that they be immunized from
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
© Nelson Lund, 2005. Forthcoming in Constitutional Commentary
12  The early cases in this line feature a prolix historical debate over the original meaning of the Constitution
on the issue of the states’ sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).  I am inclined
to think that the dissenters in these cases had the better arguments. The Court’s most recent decision leaves the details
of this debate behind, and assumes that the Framers constitutionalized a far-reaching principle of sovereign immunity
because of solicitude for the dignity of the states. See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. 743 (2002).
13  505 U.S. 144 (1992).
14  521 U.S. 898 (1997).
6
private suits for money damages in actions based on federal law.12
C In New York v. United States,13 the Court held that Congress may not “commandeer” the
legislative processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal
regulatory program.
C In Printz v. United States,14 this anti-commandeering principle was extended so as to forbid
Congress from ordering state executive officials to administer a federal regulatory program.
Except for the 6-3 decision in New York, all of these were 5-4 decisions. And just as the federalist
dissenters in Garcia refused to accept defeat, so the nationalist dissenters in these cases have vowed
to continue a fight in which they expect eventually to prevail. Notwithstanding the highly charged
nature of the debates within the Court, however, the practical importance of these new limitations
and immunities appears to be slight, and their potential to evolve into meaningful restraints on
federal power is highly questionable.
C The class of activities that the Court is willing to call non-commercial or non-economic
under Lopez and Morrison may turn out to be relatively small. And even if the Court adopts
a broad definition of non-economic activities, Congress may still find it easy to regulate most
of them under its Commerce Clause authority. Lopez itself, for example, invalidated a federal
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statute forbidding the possession of firearms near elementary and secondary schools.
Congress then reenacted the same regulation, with the minor additional proviso that it
applies only to firearms that have moved through interstate commerce at some time in the
past.15
C The sovereign immunity decisions do not exempt the states from the obligation to obey
federal laws, and they leave the federal government completely free to enforce those laws.
Even in the limited context of private suits against the states, the states are immunized only
from actions for money damages, leaving private parties free to sue for equitable relief.
C The anti-commandeering principle applies only to federal laws that directly order state
officials to carry out federal programs. New York illustrates how relatively insignificant this
limitation probably is. In the statute at issue in that case, Congress had sought to induce the
states to provide new sites for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The Court
invalidated a provision that gave states the following choice: either enact legislation that
would provide for the disposal of all internally generated radioactive waste by a date certain
or take title to the waste and thereby become liable for any damages suffered by the
generators as a result of the state’s failure to ensure its disposal. Two other provisions of the
statute, which had the same purpose (creating incentives for states to establish new disposal
sites) and which were not obviously less efficacious, were upheld. One provision authorized
states with waste disposal sites to impose a surcharge on incoming waste, and funneled some
of this tax to other states that made progress in creating new sites. Another provision allowed
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states with disposal sites to raise the price of accepting waste from out of state, and
eventually to deny access to such incoming waste. These provisions were upheld as valid
exercises of congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce and to spend federal
money. As this example suggests, federal authority under the Commerce Clause and the so-
called Spending Clause is so broad and flexible that Congress should be able rather easily
to induce the states to take virtually any action that New York and Printz forbid the federal
legislature to command directly.
Thus, at least in its current state, the Court’s jurisprudence might be described as fig-leaf federalism.
The Court has embraced the proposition that the principle of federalism necessarily entails some
limits on the national government’s power, but those limits seem almost entirely symbolic in nature.
II.   Justice Scalia’s Dissent in Tennessee v. Lane
In yet another strand of the recent federalism revival, the Court has imposed new limits on
congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” In
City of Boerne v. Flores,16 Congress had forbidden the states to adopt certain generally applicable
state laws burdening the free exercise of religion, and had defined the class of forbidden laws
differently than the Supreme Court had defined them in its most recent First Amendment decision.
Assuming the long-established proposition that the First Amendment is “incorporated” into the
Fourteenth Amendment through substantive due process, and is thus enforceable under Section 5,
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the Boerne Court held that Congress is not free to decide what the First and Fourteenth Amendments
mean: “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is.”17 The Court,
however, had previously permitted Congress to exercise its Section 5 enforcement authority against
state laws that did not themselves violate the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to remedy or prevent
such violations of the Constitution.18 In Boerne, the Court held that there “must be a congruence and
proportionality between the [constitutional] injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.”19
In a series of post-Boerne decisions, the Court invalidated several federal statutes on the
ground that they flunked this “congruence and proportionality” test. One of those cases, Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,20 held that sovereign immunity protects the states
from actions for money damages under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which
prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled persons in certain circumstances. Although
Section 5 authorizes Congress to abrogate this immunity, it does so only when the abrogating
legislation exhibits the requisite “congruence and proportionality.” The Garrett Court relied on
precedent for the proposition that discrimination against the disabled is forbidden by Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment only when it cannot survive rational basis review, and concluded a) that
Congress had failed to identify a pattern of conduct by the states that would be held unconstitutional
under this standard of review, and b) that the ADA forbids a wide range of discriminatory conduct
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that would survive rational-basis review. Several other decisions took a similar approach.21
In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,22 however, the Court allowed the states’
sovereign immunity to be abrogated on the basis of a conspicuously strained congruence-and-
proportionality analysis.23 Then, in Tennessee v. Lane,24 the Court sustained an action for money
damages against a state under Title II of the ADA, which forbids certain forms of discrimination
against the disabled in public services, programs, and activities. Lane involved a claim of
discrimination arising from architectural barriers at a court house, and the Court decided that the
statute met the congruence and proportionality test, at least insofar as it served to protect the
Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, dissented on the ground that the majority had misapplied the congruence and
proportionality test. Justice Scalia also dissented, but his solo opinion went much further.
Disclosing that he had joined the Boerne majority only “with some misgiving,”25 Scalia
contended that Hibbs and Lane demonstrated that the congruence and proportionality test, “like all
such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven
decisionmaking.”26 As an alternative, Scalia proposed to adopt the bright-line rule actually specified
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by Section 5: Congress would be authorized to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but not to
enact “prophylactic legislation” outlawing state actions that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
forbid. A very interesting wrinkle in Scalia’s proposal was an exception to this bright-line rule for
Section 5 legislation aimed at racial discrimination. Scalia framed this exception as a concession to
the principle of stare decisis, noting that many important and well-accepted racial discrimination
statutes assumed the validity of prophylactic statutes, and emphasizing that the recent Hibbs decision
was the first to uphold a prophylactic measure outside that context. In addition, Scalia stressed that
racial discrimination was the principal evil at which the Equal Protection Clause was aimed,
suggesting that an expansive reading of Section 5 in this limited context was both appropriate and
appropriately limited. The result: a clearly defined limit on congressional power under Section 5,
modified only by a clearly defined exception that is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s
principal purpose.
III.   A Tenth Amendment Exception to the Expanded Scope of Congressional Regulatory
Power
Mutatis mutandi, this same approach could be applied more generally to federalism issues.
Thus, for example, the Court’s expansive interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause could
be left in place insofar as it applies to private parties, primarily for reasons of stare decisis. With
respect to congressional regulation of the states themselves, however, the Court could revive the
original meaning of the Clause, and hold such regulations invalid unless they constitute the
regulation of interstate commerce itself. This is a bright-line rule, under which Congress would be
forbidden to use its Commerce Clause authority to regulate any activities carried out by a state (or
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its agencies and political subdivisions) unless those activities constituted buying, selling, or
bartering with out-of-state parties, or transportation across state lines for purposes of trade. This
variation or extension of Scalia’s Lane proposal may be understood as an elaboration or further
specification of O’Connor’s “spirit of the Constitution” suggestion in her Garcia dissent.
This doctrinal move could have several useful effects. First, it would create the kind of
protected sphere of state autonomy that the Garcia dissenters, and many others as well, have
believed is an enduringly important characteristic of our constitutional structure. Second, it would
do so without diminishing in any significant way the broad authority Congress now routinely
exercises over the private sector and the national economy. Congressional authority over private
actors would be untouched, and Congress could continue to regulate the states themselves when their
governments actually engage in interstate commerce. Third, the Court would have the opportunity
to develop a new kind of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, one much more faithful to the original
meaning of the Constitution, in a limited context where it is unlikely to produce politically
intolerable results. Fourth, the development of this line of case law might provide new information
about the political risks of imposing meaningful constraints on congressional power over the private
sector. Fifth, in case the political risks of major doctrinal changes in the context of private sector
regulation someday become, or appear to become, smaller than today’s Justices believe they are, the
new line of case law would be available to guide those changes.
It is, of course, possible that the proposal made here could also produce some undesirable
effects. Because the states would be freed from federal regulations that would continue to apply to
private parties, we would see a new economic incentive for states to begin carrying out functions
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that would otherwise be left to the private sector. It is doubtful, however, that these incentives would
be sufficient to counterbalance, to any significant degree, the efficiency advantages that are
generally assumed to make the private sector the preferred provider of most commercial functions.
If a significant migration of functions from the private to the public sector did occur, the most
obvious inference would be that federal regulation of the private sector had become quite excessive,
which in turn would suggest that Congress ought to cut back on such regulations. And maybe that
would happen. If, however, Congress considered it imperative to maintain high levels of regulation,
and found that competition from the newly freed states was undermining its efforts, it would always
have the old-fashioned option of initiating a genuine constitutional amendment under Article V.
The doctrinal move suggested in this paper would also need to be extended to the Court’s
jurisprudence of the spending power, which is based on this constitutional provision: “The Congress
shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” James Madison famously
interpreted this to mean that Congress is authorized to appropriate money only for programs
separately authorized by one of its enumerated powers. In the notoriously muddled Butler opinion
in 1936,27 the Court purported to reject Madison’s eminently plausible interpretation, and to adopt
the contrary view of Hamilton and Story, according to which the only limit on congressional
spending authority is that appropriations must be for the general welfare of the nation. Mysteriously,
however, the Court interpreted the Hamilton/Story position so as to make it virtually
indistinguishable from Madison’s. The statute at issue in Butler sought to reduce agricultural
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surpluses by subsidizing farmers who agreed to limit production, and Butler invalidated the statute
on the ground that it “invades the reserved rights of the states” by seeking to regulate agricultural
production, “a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal government.”28
In subsequent cases, the spending power has expanded congruently with Congress’
expanding regulatory authority. While continuing to pay lip service to the proposition that there
must be limits on the congressional spending power, the Court has not yet identified any law that
flunks the general welfare test and has never again identified a law that invades the reserved rights
of the states.29 Accordingly, a restoration of the original limits on congressional power over the
states under the Commerce Clause must be matched with a restoration of parallel limits on the
spending authority, whether through an adoption in this context of Madison’s interpretation or of
Butler’s interpretation of the Hamilton/Story position. Otherwise, as New York v. United States
illustrates, the newly revived limits on congressional regulatory power would probably prove
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illusory.30
Conclusion
Justice O’Connor opened her Garcia dissent with these words: “The Court today surveys the
battle scene of federalism and sounds a retreat.  Like Justice Powell, I would prefer to hold the field
and, at the very least, render a little aid to the wounded.” If a victory for federalism would entail a
restoration of the states to the role that the Constitution gave them, O’Connor held out little hope
of ever reaching such a goal. She observed that the states’ role in our federal system had eroded
largely through an expansion, unanticipated by the founders, of congressional power over domestic
affairs, and she gave no sign that she believed it would be practicable, or even desirable, for the
judiciary of our time to restore the original constitutional limits on congressional authority over the
nation’s citizens. But she did offer aid to the wounded states by contending that some Commerce
Clause regulations of unquestioned validity when applied to private parties could nevertheless be
struck down when applied to the states themselves, on the ground that such regulations violate the
spirit of the Constitution.
With the help of Justice Scalia’s Lane dissent, it is now possible to put this sense of the spirit
of the Constitution into a more rigorous form. Congressional powers that the Court has improperly
expanded, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce and to spend federal funds, should be
restored to their original limited scope in all those cases where federal statutes operate on the states
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themselves. This still amounts only to giving “a little aid to the wounded,” but it has the advantage
of tying the spirit of the Constitution directly to the original meaning of specific textual provisions.
And if the Court were to “hold the field” in this way, it might even prepare the ground for a more
complete restoration of the constitutional structure someday in the future. Such a restoration would
undoubtedly have to be preceded or accompanied by massive changes in public attitudes toward
congressional power, and there is little reason to expect such changes to occur anytime soon. But
such changes are not impossible, and the Court might be able to contribute in a small way to making
them more likely.
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